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A REGIONAL VIEW:

By

WELLS

1.

Riparian-Appropriation
Conflicts in the
Upper Midwest
A.

HUTCHINS*

THE SETTING

The "upper midwest" with which this paper is concerned is
confined chiefly to the states of North Dakota, South Dakota,
Nebraska, Kansas, Montana, Wyoming, and Colorado, which
contain a large part of the upper Missouri River system and
which form the northeastern corner of the solid block of the
"17 Western States" with which studies of western water law
chiefly deal.1 It includes both arid and semiarid areas, which
is characteristic of the West as a whole. And its water rights
problems have counterparts elsewhere in the West. This is
true particularly with respect to conflicts between riparian
and appropriation doctrine adherents, which have inevitably
resulted from establishment of the dual systems of water
rights in some states and attempted establishment of the riparian part of it in others.
Considering the West as a whole, the riparian-appropriation
conflict has extended throughout the last century. It originated in controversies between (1) claimants of water rights
which were acquired on a first come, first served basis and
which were beneficially exercised in connection with lands regardless of their contiguity to streams, and (2) claimants of
rights arising out of ownership of lands contiguous to streams
whether or not the rights were exercised by diverting and using water. The first group of rights comprised appropriative
rights for defined quantities of water required, pursuant to
local customs or to formal legal procedures, by diverting
stream water at definite places and applying it to reasonable
beneficial use on or in connection with specific tracts of land;
with the relative superiority of rights based on times of acquiring them, and with the rights being subject to loss for
failure to use the water for periods of time that were uno

L..B. (1909), George Washington University; Farm Economics Divis-

io., Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture.
1. With the recent admissions to statehood, the long established western group of 17 states Is now enlarged to 19.
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reasonable or that were fixed by statute. The second group,
riparianrights, attached to lands by or through which streams
of water flowed, from the times the lands passed to private
ownership; they were not gained by use or lost by disuse; and
they referred, not to specific quantities of water, but to use
of all water of the stream reasonably required for utilization
of the riparian land, with due regard to the like reasonable
requirements of all other riparian proprietors. Thus the appropriative right contemplated a tenancy in severalty; the riparian, a tenancy in common.
In the earlier stages of development of western water law,
while a "dog-in-the-manger" conduct violated the principles
of the appropriation doctrine, 2 a riparian owner in California
was "not limited by any measure of reasonableness" as against
an appropriator who sought to divert water to nonriparian
land. 3 The clash of such dissimilar ideologies, in developing
communities where demands for water were crowding upon
the extent of available supplies, was inevitable.

2. RECOGNITION AND REPUDIATION OF
WATER LAW DOCTRINES

The riparian doctrine, under which rights to the use of
streamflow became vested in contiguous private lands at the
time title was acquired from the government, came into those
states of the upper midwest that accepted it through the medium of adoption of the common law.4
The doctrine of prior appropriation, after being developed
independently by the Mormons in Utah and the goldminers in
California, came into the upper midwest chiefly as a lesult
of customs established in the far western mining camps, which
were both recognized by the courts and formalized into state
and territorial statutes.
In the eastern tier of upper midwest states-North Dakota,
South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas-both the doctrine of
2. Union Mill & Min. Co. v. Dangberg, 81 Fed. 73, 119 (D. Nev., 1897).
3. Miller & Lux v. Madera Canal & Irr. Co., 155 Cal. 59, 64, 99 Pac. 502
(1907, 1909).
4. For contrasting these as to when the tiparian doctrine became a
part of the common law of England, see: (1) Wiel, Origin and Comparative
Development of the Law of Watercourses In the Common Law and in the
Civil Law, 6 Calif. L. ReV. 245, 342 (1918); Id., IVaters: American Law and
French Authority, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 133, 147 (1919). (2) Maass, and Zobel,
Anglo-American Water Law: Who Appropriated the ]liparian Doctrine?
Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard, X Public Policy 109156 (1960).
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prior appropriation and the riparian doctrine were recognized.
In the western tier-Montana, Wyoming, and Coloradorecognition was extended only to the appropriation doctrine.
In each of these three states, the common law doctrine of
rights to the use of streamf low was repudiated in toto.
Details for the seven upper midwest states follow:
North Dakota and South Dakota-The ripariandoctrine was
recognized in the Territory of Dakota in 1866 in what was
probably the first western statute that dealt with the subject
(aside from implied recognition in legislation adopting the
common law).5 The statute read as follows:
Sec. 256. The owner of the land owns water standing
thereon, or flowing over or under its surface, but not
forming a definite stream. Water running in a definite
stream, formed by nature over or under the surface, may
be used by him as long as it remains there; but he may not
prevent the natural flow of the stream, or of the tiatural
spring from which it commences its definite course, nor
pursue, nor pollute the same.
This statute was carried over into the laws of both North Dakota and South Dakota, which were organized out of Dakota
Territory in 1899 on the same day.
Judicial recognition of riparianism was first accorded in a
territorial decision rendered in 1888 and affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in 1890.6 The territorial statute was
quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Sturr v. Beck.
Then, as state law, it was cited as current authority by the
supreme courts of both States in decisions in which riparian
rights were involved or considered. 7 The South Dakota provision, after several amendments, was repealed in 1955.1 The
North Dakota section, in substantially its original form, remains in the 1961 Century Code.9
The appropriationdoctrine was also recognized by a statute
of Dakota Territory which was carried over into the laws of
both North Dakota and South Dakota.1° Enacted in 1881, it
5. Terr. Dak. Laws 1865-1866, Civil Code § 256, approved January 12,
1866. This later became § 255 of the Dakota Civil Code.
6.
Sturr v. Beck, 6 Dak. 71, 50 N.W. 486 (1888); aff 4 Sturr v. Beck, 133
U.S. 541, 547, 551 (1890).
7. See McDonough v. Russell-Miller Mill Co., 38 N.D. 465, 471-472, 165
N.W. 504 (1917); Johnson v. Armour & Co., 69 N.D. 769, 776-777, 291 N.W.
113 (1940); Lone Tree Ditch Co. v. Cyclone Ditch Co., 15 S.D. 519, 525-527,
91 N.W. 352 (1902); Redwater Land & Canal Co. v. Reed, 26 S.D. 466, 474,
128 N.W. 702 (1910).
8. S.D. Code § 61.0101 (1939), repealed by Laws 1955, ch. 430, § 1.
9. N.D. Cent. Code § 47-01-13 (1961).
10. Terr. Dak. Laws 1881, ch. 142.

1962]

RIPARIAN-APPROPRIATION

CONFLICTS

declared rights of landowners to the use of water for mining,
milling, agricultural, or domestic purposes, subject to prior
rights acquired by doing the work necessary to comply with
the law, and it also declared principles of the appropriation
doctrine, including posting and filing certificates of location
of water rights. In each state, it was superseded by statutes
which invested administrative agencies with supervision over
appropriation of water. The Supreme Court's decision in
Sturr v. Beck recognized the existence of appropriation as well
as riparian rights in the Territory.
Nebraska-Firstrecognition of the appropriationdoctrine
appears to have been in a right of way statute enacted in
1877, and in an 1889 law which specifically authorized appropriation of water and took cognizance of the pre-existence
of appropriative rights.- Late in the last century the Nebraska Supreme Court took note of both acts; and in 1903 the
court thoroughly considered them both and held that the brief
11877 enactment was an emplied recognition of the necessity of
appropriating water for irrigation in the semiarid portions of
12
the state.
Existence of the ripariandoctrine, as modified by the irrigation statutes, was recognized by the Nebraska Supreme
Court in several cases decided late in the 19th century; and
in two decisions rendered on the same day in 1903 it was
thoroughly considered and held applicable to every part of
13
the state except as altered or supplemented by legislation.
Kansas-In this state, recognition of the ripariandoctrine
came first. It was accorded as early as 1877 and 1881,14 and
the doctrine was expounded at length in 1905.15
The first Kansas legislation authorizing appropriation of
water, initiated by posting and filing notices, was in 1886.16
Previously, according to the supreme court, rights to use water by priority of possession had not been recognized in the
jurisdiction. 17 Irrigation had not been necessary in the early
11. Neb. Laws 1877. p. 168; Laws 1889, ch. 68.
12. Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 343-350, 357-358, 362-364, 93
N.W. 781 (1903).
13. Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 339, 342, 93 N.W. 781 (1903);
Meng v. Coffee, 67 Neb. 500, 511-512, 93 N.W. 713 (1903).
14. Shamleffer v. Council Grove Peerless Mill Co., 18 Kan. 24, 31-33, 26
Am. Dec. 765 (1877); Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588, 604, 606, 608-609, 37
Am. Rep. 265 (1881).
15. Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 224-229, 237-241, 80 Pac. 671 (1905).
16. Kan. Laws 1886, ch. 115.
17. Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 240-241, 80 Pac. 571 (1905).
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days, the court said, and local customs of appropriating water
were invalid, so that it was not until 1886 that appropriative
rights could accrue.
Montana-The first Territorial legislative assembly passed
an act in 1865 providing that any holder of land adjacent to
or near a stream was entitled to use the water for irrigation
and to a canal right of way over intervening property. s Subsequent legislation recognized the doctrine of appropriation
as applicable to mining, manufacturing, agricultural, and other purposes. 19 In its first water rights decision the Montana
Supreme Court recognized this doctrine with respect to min21
ing purposes, 20 and again in a case involving irrigation.
For many years there was doubt as to whether or not the
ripariandoctrine prevailed in Montana. References to riparian
rights in the opinions in several supreme court cases decided
during that period resulted in confusing the issue. Finally, in
1921, the supreme court rendered a decision in which the
question was squarely presented for consideration, and concluded "that the common-law doctrine of riparian rights has
never prevailed in Montana since the enactment of the Bannack Statutes in 1865; that it is unsuited to the conditions

here ;.... ,,22
Wyoming-Earliest recognition of the right to appropriate
water was in 1875, when the territorial legislature passed an
act to the effect that persons possessing lands contiguous to
or in the neighborhood of any stream were entitled to use the
water for irrigation, and to the right of way for ditches intervening land. 23 An 1886 law provided specifically for the
appropriation of unappropriated water. 24 Judicial recognition
appears to have been first extended after statehood was acquired in 1890.25
Late in the last century the Supreme Court concluded that
18. Mont. Bannack Stat., p. 367, approved January 12, 1865.
19. Among other Territorial acts were Mont. Laws 1879, p. 52, and Laws
1885, p. 130.
20. Caruthers v. Pemberton, 1 Mont. 111, 117 (1869).
21. Gallagher v. Basey, 1 Mont. 457, 460-462 (1872); aff'd. Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. 670, 681-682, 685-686 (1875).
22. Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 61 Mont. 152, 157-158, 165, 166, 170-171,
201 Pac. 702 (1921). In Wallace v. Goldberg, 72 Mont. 234, 244, 231 Pac. 56
(1925), this holding was emphatically reiterated as against an assertion
of riparian right to use streamflow for domestic use and watering livestock-"the so-called natural purposes," if not for irrigation.
23. Terr. Wyo. Comp. Laws 1876 ch. 65 (December 10, 1875).
24. Wyo. Laws 1886, ch. 61, p. 284.
25. Frank v. Hicks, 4 Wyo. 502, 531, 35 Pac. 475 (1894): McPhail v. Forney, 4 Wyo. 656, 560-561, 35 Pac. 773 (1894).
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riparianrights were unsuited to the requirements and necessities of Wyoming and never had obtained therein.26
Colorado-The first Territorial legislature enacted a statute-still in the Revised Statutes of 1953-which was the
mode of the earliest Montana and Wyoming water legislation. 2 7 It accorded to holders of lands contiguous to or in the
neighborhood of any stream the use of water thereof for
irrigation, and if necessary a ditch right of way across intervening lands. This enactment, said the Colorado Supreme
Court, was intended to secure in such landholders rights to
divert water for irrigation, not to vest title to any given quantity of the streamflow. 2 In its first reported decision respecting water rights, the Supreme Court held that the nonriparian's right of way arose not only by virtue of the 1861 statute, but from the necessity of successful irrigation in Colorado. 29 The Colorado constitution, adopted in 1876, dedicated
the unappropriated water of every natural stream to appropriation by the people. 30 But, said the Supreme Court, the constitutional declaration was not the first recognition of the
doctrine of priority of appropriation;it had "existed from the
date of the earliest appropriations of water within the boun231
daries of the state.
Repudiation of the common law ripariandoctrine was foreshadowed in the earliest decisions of the Colorado Supreme
Court in water controversies. 32 In specific terms, a few years
after admission to the Union, the Supreme Court declared
33
the doctrine inapplicable to Colorado.
Although the riparian question then appeared to- be definitely settled in Colorado, some unnecessary confusion resulted late in the last century from dicta in two decisions rendered by the Supreme Court which stands alone, without value
as precedents, 34 and from a conclusion in a Federal court de26. Moyer v. Preston, 6 Wyo. 308, 318-320, 44 Pac. 845 (1896); Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 122, 61 Pac. 258 (1900).
27. Colo. Laws 1861, p. 67. Rev. Stat. §§ 147-2-1, 147-3-1, 147-3-2 (1953).
28. Crippen v. White, 28 Colo, 302-303, 64 Pac. 184 (1901).
29. Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 555, 570 (1872).
30. Colo. Const., art. XVI, §§ 5 and 6.
31. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882). Explicit recognition of the appropriation doctrine was contained in the decision in
Schilling v. Rominger, 4 Colo. 100, 103-104 (1878).
32. Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 553-555, 570 (1872); Schilling v. Rominger, 4 Colo. 100, 103, 104 (1878).
33. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446-447 (1882).
34. Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhiser Ditch Co., 23 Colo. 233, 237, 48
Pac. 532 (1896); Broadmoor Dairy & Live Stock Co. v. Brookside Water &
Improvement Co., 24 Colo. 541, 545-546, 550, 52 Pac. 792 (1898).
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cision which was expressly disapproved in a later decision by
a higher Federal court as not in accord with the decisions of
the Colorado state courts. 35 In 1909 the Colorado Supreme
Court declined to "reopen or reconsider" the question of
abolition of the common law rule in the state inasmuch as
"the matter has long ago been set at rest." 36
3. ADAPTABILITY OF THE WATER LAW DOCTRINES
TO WESTERN CONDITIONS

The West as a whole-Over the years it has been frequently
said that the doctrine of prior appropriation was better suited to the development and betterment of western agriculture
than was the riparian doctrine. The writer shares this overall
view; nevertheless, the degree to which the appropriative
principle excels in this respect bears some relation to the climatic differences between major parts of the great West.
However well suited the common law riparian doctrinewhich recognized no water rights outside the fringe of landownerships along the stream, and no priorities (except preference for domestic use) as among those contiguous to the
stream-may have been to agricultural areas in which the
rainfall was adequate for crop production year after year,
it was less suited where the precipitation only partly supplied the requirements of the land on which it fell, which if
outside the pale had no rights in the streamflow. But it was
in the arid and semiarid regions, where the areas of good
land far exceeded the quantity that could be adequately served
by available water supplies, that riparian principles were so
ill adapted and proved so generally unpopular.
Specifically, absence of time priority among riparian owners meant that the one who first fully developed his riparian
tract would have his water supply reduced and his farming
investment impaired if and when later developments by other proprietors caused the aggregate demands for water to
exceed the total available supply. Again, if and when demands
of all riparian lands exhausted the entire water supply, no
water would be available for nonriparian lands for which appropriations had been made after the riparian lands passed
35. Schwab v. Beam, 86 Fed. 41, 44 (D. Colo., 1898); Snyder v. Colorado
Gold Dredging Co., 181 Fed. 62, 68 (8th Cir., 1910).
36. Sternberger v. Seaton Min. Co., 45 Colo. 401, 402-404, 102 Pac. 168
(1909).
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to private ownership, no matter how long and at what expense the nonriparian lands had been improved for irrigation
farming, nor how much more productive they may have been
than those closer to the stream. In these vast arid and semiarid regions, protection of diversions and beneficial uses of
water according to priority in time of making them were essential to assurance of continued investment of capital and
labor in developing, first, the small individual projects and
thereafter, the larger and larger cooperative and public ones.
To these conditions the riparian doctrine proved clearly unsuited. And the monopoly of water supplies accorded to the
fringes of ownerships along the watercourses demonstrated
the riparian doctrine to be inconsistent with emerging state
policies concerned with maximum conservation and utilization
of public water supplies, and hence not conducive to the public welfare.
Considering the entire West, the six states on the 100th
meridian and the three on the Pacific Coast include both humid and semiarid areas and thus, on the whole, are "generally
less arid" in comparison with the eight intermediate "generally more arid" ones. It is in these eight intermediate states
that the riparian doctrine was repudiated. In the nine states
of the eastern and western tiers it was recognized along with
the appropriation doctrine, but in most states with ensuing
limitations placed upon riparianism intended to facilitate and
extended the prnciple of prior appropriation.
The upper midwest-In the three "generally more arid"
states of the upper midwest, the appropriation doctrine became
established as the exclusive means of acquiring rights to the
use of streamflow, and the riparian doctrine was rejected for
an overriding practical reason-that the common law riparian
doctrine of rights to use water of watercourses was unsuited
to conditions prevailing in these jurisdictions. It never had
either legislative or judicial recognition therein. "Imperative
necessity, unknown to the countries which gave it birth, compels the recognition of another doctrine in conflict therewith."
This conclusion of the Colorado Supreme Court-of outstanding importance, both legally and economically-was also reached by the supreme courts of Wyoming and Montana in the
first cases before them in which the question was squarely
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presented.3 7 In their wake were no vested riparian rights to
the use of streamflow, for none had ever vested.
In the four adjoining states on the 100th meridian, rainfall
conditions in the eastern counties are generally more favorable to agriculture than in the counties to the west. In some
parts of such a state the incentive to irrigate and to seek new
water supplies may continue in most years, while in other parts
the degree of interest may tend to vary with varying drought
conditions. The high court decisions rendered in these four
states during the 19th century do not contain expressions of
state policy-so familiar in the more arid regions-concerning
the vital need of irrigation in the public economy, the imperative necessity of an exclusive appropriative system of water
rights, and inapplicability of riparian principles in allocating
water supplies under subhumid conditions. On the contrary,
judicial acceptance of the appropriative principle was qualified by contemporaneous recognition of existence of superior
riparian rights, and in some areas it was a grudging acceptance at best. Around the turn of the century, the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that the two doctrines could and did exist
in the jurisdiction at the same time; the Kansas court agreed,
and observed further that the common law rules, as modified
by statutes enacted "for the laudable purpose of encouraging
irrigation," became the law of the state "for every stream
within its borders." 38 Irrigation had not become of statewide
concern when the riparian doctrine was established in these
jurisdictions, and problems engendered by conflicting systems
of water rights for various beneficial uses in an expanding
economy were not foreseen.
Purposes of use of water in the West-As time went on
through the first few decades of the present century, although
uses of water for power development and for municipal and
other nonagricultural purposes were more and more involved
in litigation, the greatest number of decisions in water rights
controveries throughout the West continued to be rendered in
irrigation cases. The century-long conflict between riparian
37. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446-447 (1882); Moyer v.
Preston, 6 Wyo. 308, 318-320, 44 Pac. 845 (1896); Mettler v. Ames Realty
Co., 61 Mont. 152, 170-171, 201 Pac. 702 (1921). Compare Stowell v. Johnson,
7 Utah 215, 225-226, 26 Pac. 290 (1891), in which the Territorial supreme
court said: "If that (the common law riparian doctrine) had been recognized and applied in this Territory, it would still be a desert; * * * "
38. Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 357, 93 N.W. 781 (1903); Clark
v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 229, 237-238, 80 Pac. 571 (1905).
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and appropriative principles was not essentially a struggle
between users of water for different purposes. In the earliest
controversies, which involved chiefly mining and irrigation,
neither the miners nor the agriculturists were arrayed as a
class in reliance upon one water law doctrine as against another; nor were the industrialists in later disputes. The same
held true with respect to expanded volumes of water use for
various purposes as the western country grew. Important individual conflicts between riparian and appropriative claimants of water for different purposes there were indeed; but
over the century as a whole, the largest part of water rights
litigation in the high courts of the West involved uses or prospective uses of water for irrigation.
Purposes of use in the upper midwest-It was chiefly with
respect to irrigation, then-although of course all uses of
water were affected-that the riparian doctrine was rejected
in the three "generally more arid" states of the upper midwest, and was retained along with the appropriation doctrine
in the other four. The high courts of the first group agreed
that from a practical standpoint the common law doctrine
had no place in their water economy and therefore had never
been made a part of the law. The judiciary of their four immediate neighbors on the east agreed among themselves that
the riparian doctrine did have a place, that it had become a
part of the law through adoption of the common law of England, and that coexistence of riparian and appropriative rights
was both legal and practical.
Agricultural and industrial developments of the 20th century, with constantly increasing demands upon sources of
water supply, offered proof to appropriative adherents in
the western tier that rejection of riparianism had been wise,
despite evidences that their exclusive appropriative system
was not perfect. And to the waterconscious public in the eastern tier, these present and desired prospective developments
raised serious questions as to adequacy of riparian principles
to meet challenges of the changing economy, with the result
that determined efforts were made, and are continuing to be
made, to reduce the relative importance of the riparian right.
To the nature of these riparian-appropriation relationships
in the four "generally less arid" states of the upper midwest,
and measures taken to resolve the conflicts, we now turn.
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DUAL-SYSTEM INTERRELATIONSHIPS

(1) Conflictss
The conflicts arising under the dual system of riparian and
appropriative rights stemmed from the superiority which the
riparian owner enjoyed by reason of the situation of his land
on the banks of the stream, which entitled him to have the
stream flow down to his land. Even though the common law
doctrine had been so modified as to allow a reasonable consumption of the water for irrigation, so that the riparian proprietor was required to suffer some diminution of the flow
as the result of diversions by other riparian owners, his right
to the uninterrupted flow was still good as against diversions
to nonriparian lands. When appropriators attempted to make
upstream diversions of water that from time immemorial had
been flowing to riparian lands, conflicts with the riparian
owners ensued, naturally. Bitter conflicts in some areas were
precipitated by riparian claims of right to use water wastefully, or to withhold use without sacrificing the right, as
against nonriparian diversions for useful purposes. But other
conflicts resulted simply from competition between early and
late comers for the use of water supplies of valleys, just as
numerous contests arose in that way between senior and junior claimants of appropriative rights only.
To hold that the rights of owners of riparian lands along a
stream attached to all the waters of that source necessarily
left no water open to appropriation. In such case an appropriation could become effective only upon nullification of impeding riparian rights by some process sanctioned by the law of
real property, such as grant, condemnation, or prescription.
Possible statewide remedies appeared to lie in some legislative or judicial attack against the common law riparian rightoutright rejection of the right or modification of its extent
and hence its relationship to the appropriative right.
(2)

Solutions

As noted above, the riparian doctrine of rights to the use
of streamflow was eliminated by court decision in the "gener39. The material under this and the two immediately following subtopics are taken chiefly from Hutchins, History of the Conflict Between
Riparian and Appropriative Rights In the Western States, Proc. Water
Law Conferences, Univ. of Texas, pp. 106-137, at pp. 134-135 (1952, 1954).
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ally more arid" states of Montana, Wyoming, and Colorado
owing to its unsuitability to conditions obtaining therein.
In the four states on the 100th meridian, parts of which
are generally humid and other parts arid or semiarid, the
dual systems of water rights proved so conflicting when applied to assertions of rights of both kinds on the same stream
that adjustments resulted in modification or attempted modification of riparian principles. This was not done uniformly.
Hence the extent of modification of the riparian doctrine and
the accompanying degree of effectiveness of the appropriative
principle vary considerably.
(3)

The Problem of the Unused Riparian Right

In general, efficient utilization of a limited water supply
can contribute as much to the public welfare under an individual riparian right as under an individual appropriative right.
But where the riparian right entitles the holder to use the
water inefficiently and wastefully, or to keep the right intact indefinitely while himself making no use of the water,
then the successful assertion of that right can be an impediment to water development. In some states, modifications of
riparian principles in the public interest, made as the result
of conflicts, have lessened or removed the obstructive aspects
of the early common law principles.
Solution of the perplexing problem of the unused riparian
right was the major objective of the projects described below.
(4)

Adjustments in the Dual-System States

Nebraska-The courts of this state took their major steps
toward limiting the operation of the riparian doctrine shortly
after the turn of the century. Among many points decided in
the landmark case of Crawford Co. v. Hathaway40 were these:
The common law riparian doctrine was not inapplicable to
conditions prevailing in the whole or in any part of the state
simply because irrigation was necessary in some parts. In
the operation of the concurrently existing dual systems of water rights, preference is determined by the time when either
rights accrues-riparian when title is taken to the land, ap40.

67 Neb. 325, 364, 93 N.W. 781 (1903).
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propriative when the right is perfected. The statute of 1889
abrogated the riparian rule as to lands thereafter passing to
private ownership and substituted prior appropriation, which
had prevailed under prestatutory conditions. This legislation
did not and could not abolish rights already accrued; it prevented their future acquirement. According to the court,
"the conclusion appears to us irresistible" that one who acquires a valid appropriative right has a title to the use of
water superior to that of a riparian proprietor whose right
either was subsequently acquired or was lost by grant or prescription.
Two cases decided soon thereafter dealt with remedial
rights of riparian and appropriative claimants as against each
other, rather than with substantive rights or interests in
property of which they may have been possessed. 41 In each
of these cases, the trial court's judgment was first reversed
and in each one on rehearing the former judgment was reversed and the lower court's action was affirmed. The two
opinions on rehearing were handed down on the same day.
Comment herein refers only to the final decisions on rehearing.
(a) The McCook case. An appropriator (irrigation company) sued to restrain upstream riparians from depriving it of
its appropriated water supply, the right to which had been
adjudicated under the statutory procedure. The riparians had
neither diverted nor attempted to divert water for irrigation
until long after the appropriative right had vested.
The Nebraska Supreme Court held in the McCook case
that the right of the riparians to damages, if any, to their
riparian estate by denial of reasonable use of water when it
interfered with the downstream appropriation, was problema41.
McCook Irr. Water Power Co. v. Crews, 70 Neb. 109, 96 N.W. 996
(1903); 70 Neb. 115, 121-123, 127, 102 N.W. 249 (1905). Cline v. Stock, 71
Neb. 70, 71-72, 98 N.W. 454 (1904); 71 Neb. 79, 81-83, 102 N.W. 265 (1905).
Citing the statement to this effect in the opinion on rehearing in the McCook case, (WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES,) vol. 1.
§ 617, footnote 9 (1911), says "Yet denying the owner the procedure by
which his right is protected, his right is, in effect, denied in substance.
The court takes away the private right wlen it takes away the means by
which it lives." And In the text of § 617, he offers the further criticism:
"The cases arose after the court had declared riparian rights to exist in
Nebraska (as in California), which was an unpopular position. The property taken in these cases was the riparian right, and the court took this
way of largely nullifying its former decisions. One need not find fault
with decisions making an open rejection of riparian rights, but only with
decisions which go around by the back way to nullify rights which previous cases, at the front door, said they were upholding."
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tical and would have to be determined in an action brought
by the riparians; and that the question of substantial damages
would depend upon the state of proof. This right might prove
to be so infinitesimal that the law would not take note of it,
and the damages might be nominal only. The court did not
-believe that a riparian who built irrigation works with full
knowledge of existing appropriative rights should be entitled
to greater compensation because of that after accrual of appropriations either upstream or downstream. A different situation would arise if the riparian actually diverted and used
irrigation water before appropriative rights attached. So the
order of injunction was affirmed by the Supreme Court, without prejudice to the defendants' rights to recover any damages
that had been sustained.
(b) Cline v. Stock. Here, on the other hand, the plaintiff
was a lower riparian owner who alleged upstream diversions
by defendants but who did not state what their claims were;
and who alleged his own riparian ownership, prescription, and
if the appropriation doctrine were held to prevail, priority of
his own appropriation. A general demurrer was sustained.
In upholding in Cline v. Stock the trial court's refusal to
grant the riparian an injunction, the Nebraska Supreme Court
held that: If defendant appropriators had duly applied to the
state administrative agency and had obtained an adjudication
giving them a right to appropriate water for irrigation and,
in pursuance thereof, had constructed works and actually diverted and used their rightful quantity of water in the same
manner and to' the same extent that they proposed to use it
in the future-then a lower riparian proprietor could not enjoin continued use of the water but must rely upon his action
at law to recover such damages, if any, as he might sustain
thereby. The court evinced no doubt of the soundness of this
principle.
The Nebraska Supreme Court was apparently convinced,
at the rehearings in these two cases, (1) that the public welfare would be served by the expansion of irrigation development in the state, and (2) that progress in this direction
would be facilitated by a more liberal interpretation of the appropriation-riparian relationship, rather than by a doctrinaire reaffirmation of strict common law principles that were
surely becoming outmoded in the growing West, and of pro-
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cedures for perpetuating them. The decisions were rendered
more than a half-century ago, and they have not been overruled. Their effect was to eliminate much of the advantage of
location of the riparian tract under its common law right,
with respect to appropriative rights on the same stream, except in case of a riparian who made actual use of the water
on his land before conflicting appropriation rights vested.
Kansas-The decision in Clark v. Allaman, rendered almost
contemporaneously with the Nebraska decisions above noted,
expounded in considerable detail the facets of the riparian
doctrine; but it also held that while fundamental in the jurisprudence of the state, this doctrine had been modified by irrigation legislation enacted in 1886 and following years, and
that the dual systems of water rights existed in the state.4 2
Of course the irrigation statutes could not operate to the destruction of previously vested common law rights. But that
diversion and appropriation of water for beneficial purposes
was a public use was evidenced by the statutes.
During the ensuing 30 years the principle of prior appro .
priation, subject to previously vested common law rights, appeared to have substance. Then in 1936 the Kansas Supreme
Court again considered the appropriation statute of 1886, but
withheld judgment as to its effect on the riparian status of
lands that passed to private ownership after its enactment,
inasmuch as in the instant case such a decision was not necessary. 43 Eight years later, in a ground water case, the Supreme
Court emphatically reaffirmed the common law right of the
landowner to waters either on or in his land, and held that
the state officials had no statutory authority to consider an
application to appropriate ground waters or to allocate or distribute them. 4 The unquestioned implication was that this
disability applied equally to appropriations from surface
streams.
The Peterson decision appeared to leave the Kansas water
appropriation system in a legal vacuum. It was now imperative to appraise the situation and to do something about it.
Accordingly, the Governor appointed a committee to study the
42. Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 237-239, 241, 80 Pac. 571 (1905).
43. Frizell v. Bindley, 144 Kan. 84, 91-93, 58 P.2d 95 (1936).
44. State ex rel. Peterson v. State Board of Agricult fre, 158 Kan. 603,
605-614, 149 P.2d 604 (1944).
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state water laws and make recommendations. The committee
held conferences and, before the end of the year, made its
report recommending enactment of a statute that would be
effectual in bringing common law water rights under public
control. The committee pointed out that the Kansas statutes,
as a result of court decisions, had not been effective in establishing an orderly appropriation system to supersede the common law. But it was believed that conditions in the state, and
the needs of the people, had changed so greatly since early
adoption of the common law as applied to water use, as to
justify such modification of the common law as would provide
an effectual system of prior appropriation, while allowing anyone damaged by an appropriator's use of water to recover for
45
actual damage.
The ensuing legislature of 1945 passed an act that followed
closely the legislation recommended in the committee's report.46 Its purpose was to strengthen the appropriation doctrine in Kansas, and to reduce the advantage of location of
lands riparian to surface streams and overlying ground waters
as against appropriations for beneficial use on nonriparian
and nonoverlying lands. Experiences in other states in deflating the importance of unused common law rights were drawn
upon and adapted to Kansas conditions. The precedents in
point were chiefly from Nebraska, noted immediately above,
and from Oregon 4 7 both early in the present century. In 1957,
after conferences by the state administrators with representatives of other state and federal agencies, extensive amend48
ments of the 1945 law were made.
45. "The Appropriation of Water for Beneficial Purposes. A Report to the
Governor on Historic, Physical and Legal Aspects of the Problem in Kansas. Submitted to the Honorable Andrew F. Schoeppel, Governor of Kansas,
December, 1944," 79 pp. Topeka, Kansas. The committee's meetings included
a two-day conference at Topeka, to which several persons experienced in
western water law, including the present writer, came from distant points
at the committee's invitation to assist in its deliberations.
46, Kan. Laws 1945, ch. 390; Gen. Stat. §§ 82a-701 to 82a-722 (1949).
47. Ore. Laws 1909, ch. 216, § 70; Rev. Stat., § 539.010 (1955). This section provided, in brief, that actual application of water to beneficial use,
prior to enactment of the statute should be deemed to create in the riparian proprietor a vested right to the extent of such use, if not abondoned
for a continous period of 2 years; likewise, if work were then being constructed and water was applied to beneficial use within a reasonable time
thereafter; and that all such rights should be adjudicated under the proceedings set up in the statute. This riparian legislation was sustained by
majority decisions of State and Federal courts in: In re Hood River, 114
Ore. 112, 173-182, 227 Pac. 1065 (1924); dismissed for want of jurisdiction
for want of a final judgement, Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Bayer, 273 U.S.
647 (1926). California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73
F.2d 555, 562-569 (9th Cir., 1934). The Federal court's decree that assertion of a common law riparian right could not be sustained was affirmed, but on a different ground, In: California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver
Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 155-165 (1935).
48. Kan. Laws 1957, ch. 539.

[Vol. 38

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

Nowhere in the 1945 law or in the 1957 amendments is the
*term "riparian" used. Instead, "common law claim" relates to
both surface and ground waters. Subject to vested rights, all
waters in the state may be appropriated for beneficial use
(§§ 82a-702 and 82a-703). "Vested right" is the right of a
common law or statutory claimant to continue use of water
actually applied to beneficial use on or before the effective
date of the 1945 act or within a reasonable time thereafter
with the use of works then under construction; it may not be
impaired except for nonuse (§§ 82a-701 and 82a-703). No permittee may be prevented from proceeding with his appropriation by anyone without a vested right, or a prior appropriation
right, or an earlier permit (§82a-712). A common law claimant injured by an appropriation or by authorized works may
have compensation in a suitable action at law for damages
proved for any property taken. Any holder of a valid water
right or permit may enjoin a subsequent diversion by a common law claimant who has no vested rights, without first having to condemn those common law rights. And an appropriator may protect his priority by injunction as against a later
appropriator. (§ 82a-716.)
Validity of the 1945 statute was passed on by the Kansas
Supreme Court in a decision which was confined to questions
of unconstitutionality that had been presented for determination, all of which the court answered in the negative. 49 No
specific claims of rights to use water were involved, and so
none were adjudicated. But the court took note of activities
of the Governor's committee and its recommendations; quoted with approval the legislative declaration that all water in
the state was dedicated to public use, subject to state control
and regulation; and stated that pursuant to the legislation a
new approach to the problem of use of water resources must
now be taken. "Unused or unusable rights predicated alone
upon theory become of little if any importance." Broad judicial statements previously made respecting riparian rights
must now be disregarded or modified to harmonize with the
new approach. The key principle in the supreme court's thesis
is the beneficial use that the individual is making of the water
or has the right to make of it.
49. State
440 (1949).
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Subsequently a three-judge Federal District Court concluded that the statute does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that it is
constitutional.5°
Opponents of the change in basic state policy evidenced by
the 1945 and 1.957 legislation did not give up. Several proceedings in one controversy extending over a period of years were
decided on appeal on procedural grounds, without passing on
the constitutional issue. 51 In an appeal in a different case, in
which allegations of unconstitutionality were made, the supreme court discussed no matters other than pleadings and
propriety of the trial court in acting upon them, observed
that other questions raised by the parties were premature,
5
and remanded the case with instructions. 2
South Dakota-Early in the present century the South
Dakota Supreme Court emphasized that the two systems of
water rights prevailed in the state; that the trial court should
be able to properly adjust conflicting rights on a stream after
full consideration of all circumstances; and that as between
appropriators only, or between an appropriator and a riparian
owner, relative superiority of rights would be determined by
their respective times of accrual-appropriation as of the
date of priority, riparian at the time of settlement on the
tract with the intention of making formal entry, provided
that title was finally acquired from the government. 53 It was
also held that the riparian right could not be lost by disuse
and hence did not depend upon its being exercised, but that
it afforded to the proprietor the right to use all water needed
at any reasonable time to properly irrigate all his riparian
land, and that it was only the surplus (if any) over what
might be legally used by riparians and other lawful appropria54
tors that might be the subject of permit under the statute.
A judicial limitation on the purposes for which a riparian
50. Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617 (D. Ran. 1956); affirmed per
eurlam, 352 U.S. 863 (1956).
51. Hesston & Sedgwick v. Smrha, 179 Kan. 72, 293 P.2d 241 (1956); 184
Kan. 223, 336 P.2d 428 (1959); 186 Kan. 477, 351 P.2d 204 (1960); 186 Kan.
785, 352 P.2d 1053 (1960).
52. Huber v. Schmidt, 188 Kan. 36, P.2d 854 (1961).
53. Lone Tree Ditch Co. v. Cyclone Ditch Co., 15 S.D. 519, 521-522, 527530, 91 N.W. 352 (1902); Stenger v.
Tharp, 17 S.D. 13, 20, 94 N.W. 402
(1903); Redwater Land & Canal Co. v. Jones, 27 S.D. 194, 203-204, 130
N.W.

85 (1911).

54, Redwater Land & Canal Co. v. Reed, 26 S.D. 466, 487-488, 128 N.W.
702 (1910); St. Germain Irrigating Ditch Co. v. Hawthorne Ditch Co., 32
S.D. 260, 268, 143 N.W. 124 (1913).
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right might be exercised in South Dakota was imposed for
about two decades and was then removed. Prior to, 1921 the
South Dakota Supreme Court adhered to the principle that
the riparian right of use not only for domestic purposes but
for reasonable irrigation is a vested property right 5 In that
year, however, in Cook v. Evans, the court was called upon
to decide for the first time the effect of the Desert Land Act
of 1877,56 and as a result expressed its agreement with the
7
conclusion of the Oregon Supreme Court in Hough v. Porter
to the effect that by that act Congress severed from all public
lands not then entered all rights to the use of waters adjacent
thereto except the riparian right of use for domestic purposes,
all remaining waters being dedicated to the public for appropriation for irrigation and other proper purposes under
applicable laws and customs. Subsequently the United States
Supreme Court declared that following enactment of the Desert Land Act, if not before, all nonnavigable waters then a
part of the public domain became publici juris, subject to the
plenary control of the public land states and territories, "with
the right in each to determine for itself to what extent the
rule of appropriation or the common-law rule in respect of
riparian rights should obtain." 5 Thereafter, in the light of
this authoritative high court interpretation, the South Dakota
Supreme Court re-examined its own 1921 decision in Cook v.
Evans and concluded that it had been in error therein, because
previously thereto its decisions had established the principle
that riparian rights including the right to irrigate were obtainable though settlement on land as well as under the territorial appropriation statute. 59 Thus was the right to irrigate
riparian land re-established in the jurisprudence of South Dakota as a part of the riparian right.
Restrictions upon agricultural expansion under irrigation
inherent in the problem of unused riparian rights continued
to plague proponents of the appropriation doctrine. Studies
were made and conferences were held; and in 1955, in a care55. St. Germain Irrigating Ditch Co. v. Hawthorne Ditch Co., 32 S.D.
260, 267, 143 N.W. 124 (1913).
56. Cook v. Evans, 45 S.D. 31, 38-39, 185 N.W. 262 (1921). Followed in
Haaser v. Englebrecht, 45 S.D. 143, 146-147, 186 N.W. 572 (1922). Desert
Land Act: 19 Stat. 377 (1877).
57. Hough v. Porter, 51 Ore. 318, 383-407, 95 Pac. 732 (1908), 98 Pac.
1083 (1909), 102 Pac. 728 (1909).
58. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295
U.S. 142, 163-164 (1935).
59. Platt v. Rapid City, 67 S.D. 245, 248-250, 291 N.W. 600 (1940).
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fully worded act relating to appropriation of water of surface
streams, the South Dakota legislature undertook to define and
to protect vested rights to the use of water so far as they per-

tain to actual beneficial use, following the precedents set by
the legislatures of Oregon and of Kansas as sustained by the

high courts in those states.60 The term "vested rights" was

defined as including the right of a riparian owner to continue

beneficial use of water to the extent actually made at the
time of enactment of the statute or within the immediately
preceding three years, or to make such use with works then
under construction if they were completed and application of
water was begun within a reasonable time thereafter. "Vested rights" also included use of water for domestic purposes as
that term is defined in the act. (§ 61.0102(7).) All vested
rights as defined were validated (§ 61.0106) ; and subject to
vested rights and prior appropriations, all waters flowing in
definite streams were declared open to appropriation (§ 61.0109).
Constitutionality of the 1955 legislation has not yet been
passed on by the South Dakota Supreme Court. 61 Assuming
its validity: (1) Land that conformed to riparian criteria but
that was not, when the act was passed, under irrigation or
recently irrigated or in preparation therefor, has no longer a
riparian right for irrigation. (2) Similarly, unless perpetuated
by these requirements, the right of a riparian to use water
for other so-called artificial purposes (for example, mining,
manufacturing, development of power) no longer exists. (3)
The right to use riparian water for domestic purposes as defined in the act is not subject to these restrictions. On the
contrary, domestic use is unqualifiedly declared to be a vested
60. S.D. Laws 1955, ch. 430; Code (1960 Supplement), §§ 61.0101 to
61.0156. A companion statute relating to appropriation of ground waters
was also passed: Laws 1955, ch. 431; Code (1960 Supplement), §§ 61.0401
to 61.0430.
61. A ruling by the South Dakota Supreme Court on the constitutionality
of the 1955 water legislation is expected to be sought in a suit pending in
the circuit court in Butte County, South Dakota. According to a letter
to the author from J.W. Grimes, Executive Officer, South Dakota State
water Resources Commission, dated March 5. 1962 (quoted with his permission), the suit is titled Belle Fourche Irrigation District v. Smiley and
was brought February 1, 1961; the State of South Dakota and the State
Water Resources Commission. intervened in the public interest July 21,
1961; complaints and amended complaints have been filed and answered;
adverse examinations of the defendant and the manager for the irrigation
district have been taken; agreement on substantial stipulations as to the
facts had not been reached on March 5, 1962 but is anticipated by lawyers
representing both sides; and neither the anticipated pre-trial conference
nor the trial had then been scheduled.
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right and is accorded a preferential status in the state water
policy62
North Dakota-Although relations as between appropriators only, and as between riparians only, have been considered
by both the legislature and the courts of North Dakota, interrelationships of the two groups have been meager.
The first territorial legislative declaration on water rights
in 1866, long before the appropriation doctrine was recognized, referred to riparian rights only, and it is still on the
state statute books. The second, in 1881, which announced
certain rights of landowners for certain purposes of use but
subjected them to valid prior appropriations, was replaced
in North Dakota by the present state water rights statute
first enacted in 1905.
The latest pronouncement of the North Dakota legislature,
in 1955, is a major declaration as to what are the several
and reciprocal rights of nonmunicipal riparian owners-without mentioning appropriators-thus :63
61-01-01.1. Reciprocal Rights of Riparian Owners. The
several and reciprocal rights of a riparian owner, other
than a municipal corporation, in the waters of the state
comprise the ordinary or natural use of water for domestic and stockwatering purposes.
In the earliest territorial water rights case, Sturr v. Beck,
it was adjudged that an earlier homesteader had made a prior
appropriation of both land and water even without making use
of the water, as against a later downstream entryman who
trespassed upon the upper land in order to locate a water
right thereon.64 But no later supreme court decision involved
a controversy over rights to use the waters of a particular
source in which the adverse parties consisted of appropriative
claimants on the one hand and riparian claimants on the other.
In fact, in none of the succeeding North Dakota Supreme
Court cases in which riparian rights were litigated was any
question of appropriative rights involved.6 5 In the absence of
62. The statute declares the established policy of the state to be that
use of water for domestic purposes is the highest use and takes precedence over all appropriative rights (§ 61.0101 (5a)); and it exempts
"reasonable use of water from any source for domestic purposes" from
appropriation permit requirements (§ 61.0107).
63. N.D. Laws 1955, ch. 345, § 2. Codified as § 61-01-01.1. There may
possibly be some question of sufficiency of the title of the bill which was
enacted into law as chapter 345, Laws of 1955. The title referred only to
amendment and reenactment of § 61.0101, which was done in § 1 of the act;
it did not mention reciprocal rights of riparian owners which comprised § 2.
64. Sturr v. Beck, 6 Dak. 71, 50 N.W. 486 (188R); nff'd., 133 U.S. 541 (1890).
65. Bigelow v. Draper, 6 N.D. 152, 69 N.W. 570 (1896); Brignall v. Han-
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riparian versus appropriative litigation in North Dakota
throughout nearly three-quarters of a century--during which
period irrigation development expanded slowly by contrast
study of doctrinal interrelawith most Western states -a
tionships yields a paucity of explicit criteria as to the relative
importance in this jurisdiction of conflicting philosophies of
rights to the use of water.
While the legislature in 1955 redeclared that owners of riparian land have certain rights arising out of such ownership,
it took a further step in undertaking to limit these rights. But
what is the full purport of this section? By use of the word
"reciprocal" it would seem evident that rights of riparian owners are limited at least as against each other, provided of
course that the word "compromise' relates to the whole and
therefore excludes all purposes of using water other than domestic and stockraising. But in making this declaration in
the second section of a statute which in its first section amended and enlarged a section of the water appropriation statute declaring what waters are public and subject
to appropriation, was it intended to go further and to limit
these riparian rights as against conflicting appropriations as
well? One might assume from the juxtaposition of statutory
sections that the arrangement was intended to serve as a
basis for denying irrigation water rights to riparian owners
except through the process of appropriating water therefor
under the general statutory procedure, and that the lack of
explicit statement is unintentional. However, the purpose of
the legislation is not clearly expressed, and the supreme court
has not yet had occasion to pass upon the purport of this section, or upon its constitutionality, in a litigated case.
It is obviously impossible at this time to make a definitive
statement of the respective legal importance of the riparian
right and appropriation right as against each other, in the
jurisprudence of North Dakota. Conclusions, however plausible, are necessarily tentative and qualified by absence of direct authority.
(5) Summary of Adjustments
Nebraska's solution of the problem of the unused riparian
nah, 34 N.D. 174, 157 N.W. 1042 (1916); McDonough v. Russell-Miller Mill.
Co., 38 N.D. 465, 165 N.W. 504 (1917); Johnson v. Armour & Co., 69 N.D.
769. 291 N.W. 113 (1940); Ozar-Mahoning Co. v. State, 76 N.D. 464, 37
N.W. 2d 488 (1949).
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right was made by the state supreme court, without specific
direction by the legislature. In Kansas, South Dakota, and
North Dakota, the legislatures took the initiative, the first
two states building their respective state policies on precedents set by the Nebraska Supreme Court and by the Oregon
legislature.
The Nebraska judicial solution consisted of limiting the riparian owner's available remedies as against an appropriator
but without denying the right of the former to use water. It
met both approbation as being justified in the public interest,
and criticism as destroying the water right through denial of
the remedy of injunction. In both Kansas and South Dakota
the legislatures defined vested rights, limited them to present
actual beneficial use of water, and protected them as such;
thus precluding new uses of water in the future by riparian
proprietors unless they should elect to appropriate the new
water under the statutory procedure. The North Dakota legislature chose to declare what are the several and reciprocal
rights of a nonmunicipal riparian owner.
It is inevitable that radical changes in water rights doctrines of a state in which the water economy is vitally important should, in the first instance, be difficult to achieve
and, when enacted, be subjected to powerful attacks on
grounds of invalidity by reason of conflict with the federal
and state constitutions. The Nevada Supreme Court spoke understandingly of such attacks, thus: "We do not accept radical
changes without protest. If a statute radically different from
anything to which we have been accustomed is enacted, the
average lawyer becomes alarmed and at once brands it as unconstitutional."66 And with respect to the same subject, a
California District Court of Appeal remarked that "every
forward-looking piece of legislation meets the old and timehonored objection-unconstitutional." 6 7 Certainly, the right
to the use of water is a right of real property, protected by
well-established safeguards within our constitutional framework. As judicial holdings in the Western states are not in
accord as to whether the riparian right applies to future as
well as to present use of water, a move in an undeclared state
to limit the riparian right to the actual beneficial use made
66. Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. District Court, 42 Nev. 1, 26-27, '171
Pac. 166 (1918).
67. Bray v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 428, 441, 268 Pac. 374 (1928).

1962]

RIPARIAN-APPROPRIATION

CONFLICTS

currently may find support in out-of-state precedents and in
the materially changed economic conditions of the area, and
at the same time may invite opposition on the ground that the
right of future riparian use is stare decisis in the jurisdiction.
The legal process adjudged by the Nebraska Supreme Court
with respect to present and future uses of water by riparians
is an established part of the state's jurisprudence, with no
successful challenge in the 57 years that have elapsed since
the decisions were rendered. The Oregon legislature's declaration on the same subject, upon which Kansas drew so heavily,
has had 53 years of experience during which it survived attacks of invalidity in both State and Federal courts. In both
Oregon and Kansas many riparian cases had been decided in
the high courts before the legislatures spoke, 68 but thereafter
neither court said that the matter of future use of water was
stare decisis. On the contrary, the Oregon Supreme Court was
of the opinion that the common law having been partially
adopted by statute, the common law rule as to riparian rights
might be changed by statute except as such change might affect some vested right, and that it was within the province
of the legislature to define a vested right of a riparian owner. 69 And the Kansas Supreme Court, instead of turning to
stare decisis, observed that broad judicial statements previously made respecting riparian rights must now give way
to the legislative declaration subjecting all water in the state
to public regulation; and that the change was an appropriate
one for the legislature to make.-.
The 1955 statutes of both Dakotas await judicial scrutiny.
Apparently the North Dakota legislation was not taken from
other western water administration statutes, and it will probably require construction of its purport and effectiveness as
well as its constitutionality. In South Dakota, it was with
consideration of successful precedents set in Oregon and Kansas, both of which had the approval of both state and federal
courts, that the legislature made its bold declaration of state
water policy in the interest of the public welfare.

68. Hutchins, The Common-Law ,Riparian Doctrine in Oregon: Legislative and Judicial Modification, 36 Ore. L. Rev. 193-220 (1957); Id., THE
KANSAS LAW OF WATER RIGHTS (1957).
69. In re Hood River, 114 Ore. 112, 181, 227 Pac. 1065 (1924).
70. State ex el. Emery v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 555-556, 207 P.2d 440
(1949).

